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1O
11
,-_12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Dr. Allen Panzer,
)
Amy Sayers,
)
Lily Jeung and
)
Darren Walchesky, on behalf of
)
themselves and all others similarly)
situated,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
}

CV13-{D70805-DDP-J'CG

•

Plaintiffs' Opposition to
Special Motion to Strike
Complaint demanding wages
pursuant to Fair Labor Standards
Act, and contract based cause of
action Quanfum Mm"Uit, Requestfor
plailntiffs' attorney fees

)
V§.

) Febuary 10, 2014
) 10:00 asn.
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Yelp, Inc.

23
24

Defendant.

) Courtroom 3, 2 nd Floor
) Hon. Judge Dean D. Pl'egel'son
)

25

COMES NOW PLAINTIFFS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION

26

TO STRIKE CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION QUANTUM MERUIT based

27

on their intentional misreading of the anti SLAPP statute. Request for

28

attorney fees. This lawsuit has nothing to do with "Speech" but is routine FLSA

29

action to get these plaintiffs their wages~

31

Daniel A. Bernath, Esq. .January 10,2014
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PlAiNTIFIrS @II"POSITION TO g':RiVOlOI..!5 SPEelAL MOTION TO STRIKE

(OPPOSITION ,0 ANTH-SLAP~ MOTION)
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Plaintiffs submitted their content ,"lith a reasonable expectation of
compensation .. -4

Defendant Yelp! was sued for Breach of Contract Type causes of action And
not Defamation as such, the anti-SLAPP statutes Do not apply ... 5

The 9th Circuit repeatedly recognizes A cause of action for unjust
enrichment ... 15

Tasini v. AOL 851 F.Supp 2d 734 Is not a Fair Labor Standards Wage Case
But investors who allegedly paid their share in product demanded a
percentage oWl1ership of Huffington Post .... 16

Plaintiffs are all ""riters for Yelp A..'1d unlike Wal··Mart v Dukes Do not have
separate supervisors At separate stores who have discriminated In separate
ways ... 17
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sex, hetro, homo, perverted, free liquor and demands of more labor from
plaintiffs. .... 19

California's anti SLAPP statute Procedural and not substantive ... 25
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

33
34

Once again, Yelp is tI-visting settled law in the hopes that nobody win

35

notice. 1 Yelp is again sued in a run-of-the mill FLSA action with a pendent

36

state court equity cause of action for contract/quantum meruit. Yelp wsts

37

this to say that 1. Yelp is on the internet,

38

2.

Plaintiffs have posted their labolrs For Yelp on the internet,

39

2.

Therefore, Yelp hag immunity frm"l'1 an FLSA lawsuit.

40

Under Yelp's continual "wsted" legal reasoning fiu, a Yelp CEO could

41

spill his yogurt in the lobby and Yelp would be immune from a personal

42

injury lawsuit if the victim also posted 011 Yelp. If Yelp stops paying its San

43

Francisco landlord, Yelp believes that an anti SLAPP motion should get that

44

contract caUse of action dismissed. Yelp has just hit on this "twisty"

45

strategy however, Earlier, when Yelp laborers in the sales department were

46

not paid overtime and sued Yelp, Yelp didn't have the audacity to bring an

47

anti SLAPP motion. Larkin v. Yelp (attached) Yelp was sued by laborers

48

who they named "account executive trainee, junior a.c;, account executive

49

and senior account executive,

IOn April 26, 2013, after hearing sworn testimony from a Yelp! s executive,
Trial Judge Peter S. Doft in San Diego California declared that Yelp! wsts
the law to make it say the exact opposite of settled legal principles .... I'm just
stunned actually I mean, every single bit of settled law is wsted around by
[Yelp! J. Everything is twisted around."
PIoAiNTIHS OIr"POSITI<l:JN 1'0 FRIVOLOUS ~PE(;IAL MOTION iO STRIKE
(Oppo:sunoN' Til ANl'i-1U,A!F"P MOitION)

50

This is the same thing Yelp has done with its writers-calling

51

some "Community Managers", "eluployees", G£Scouts", "Elites",

52

etc. but all doing the exact same labors for Yelp with some people

53

paid wages and plaintiffs herein, not being paid wages. Plaintiffs herein

54

provided reviews to attract an audience for defendant Yelp, said audience

55

used as the basis for the salesman to make sales contracts with advertisers.

56

Yelp's defenses to the Larkin FL.SA action was not a frivolous anti SLAPP

57

motion but 'Gplamtiffs, have signed Teleases that prevent them

58

from bringing" an FSLA lawsuit. Larkin. Settlement Motion, page 3,

59

Lines 7-9 Attached) Yelp finally paid $1,250,000 to the unpaid salesmen as

60

part of the settlement in that FLSA action.

61

Yelp trots out the same frivolous defenses that laborers "agreed" to work

62

for free and can't sue Yelp under the provisions of The Fair Labor

63

Standards Act. Larkin Settlement Motion. Rather than repeat the P and

64

A's that hold Yelp's defense is frivolous, Plaintiffs invite the Court to look

65

the Opposition to Strike where the law is clear that a laborer cannot waive

66

his or her rights under the FSLA. The TOS that Yelp produces, especially

67

the so called Elite TOS were drafted by Yelp well after the employment

68

relationship began (Indeed, the Elite TOS was drafted by defendant

69

specifically to have this judge read it in this motion).
IPLAINTIFfS @PP!!)SITION TO FRIVOLOIJS SPECIAL MonON YO STRIKE
(@pposm@N YO AN'Il'n-~l\.APIP MOTION)

,

•

70

PLAINTIFFS SUBMITTED 'liHEIR CON'UENT WIYH A REASONABLE

71
72

Yelp paid Community Managers, Scouts and paid for well over 200,000

73

reviews; Yelp admits an these laborers were paid in wages. Plaintiffs have

74

repeatedly pled that they were paid, as were the Glatt v. Fox Searchlight

75

plaintiffs, but as yet, not in FLSA required wages and not wages as Yelp has

76

paid its hundreds of thousands of other writers [So many reviewers were

77

paid that Yelp admits to the SEC and FTC that it is beyond t.'heir ability to

78

. count. SEC filing by Yelp]. Complaint 6,9,10,11, 12, Defendant again

79

deceives this Court by falsely stating that at Compo 15-18 "used Yelp for

80

socialnetvl'orking." Plaintiffs say no such thing. Yelp is saying that because

81

plaintiffs liked their job as vvriters that they should not be paid. Again,

82

and of course, Yelp again gives no authority for such a proposition.

83

This motion is 100% frivolous and and/or for the purpose of delay and

84

plaintiffs should be reimbursed for their attorney tees to oppose it and to

85

send Yelp the judicial equivalent of an email-such nonsense will not be

86

tolerated in our Courts.

87

The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has emphatieally stated that contract type

88

causes of action cannot be reached by the anti SLAPP motion and there is

89

no immunity for contract causes of action under the CDA. Barnes V.
PLAiNTiffS OPPOSITION TO fRIVOI.OlJS $PtECIA!. MOTION YO STRIKE
{OPPOSITION ,0 ANTI-SU\PP MOTION)

•
90

Yahoo, i'(l,fra. Yelp has repeatedly been given this 9th Cir. Case in Bernath v.

91

Yelp in Oregon Circuit Court and in a letter to meet and confer requesting

92

that Yelp withdraw their frivolous Special Motion to Strike. (attached)

93

95

TYPE CAUSES CF ACTBCN

96

AND !l\l!@Y DEFAMATION

97

AS StllCif~w l'H~ A~"i!'i-$rtA.fP'P STA'fU'fES

98

~~ N@'!i A~ti!'LY

99

Defendant's motion is a disgrace, submitted by a new admittee to the

100

California Bar, Shanti Michaels #277552 and a boiler plate motion that

101

the so called CALIFORNIAAI\ITI SLAPP PROJECT has used again and

102

again and again to burden the Courts and plaintiffs. Yelp demands this

103

Comt stretch this law; like a lower lip pulled over the Court's head. Yelp

104

opinies that as PLAINTIFFS spoke on a public forum that the FLSA

105

complaint must be dismissed pursuant to the anti SLAPP statute. Yelp

106

says that not paying wages is "conduct in furtherance of the

107

exercise oftheuoconstitutionall'ight offree speech." sic Motion

108

p.ll, LlO-12.

109

routine FSLA action into a mislabeled crusade to save "Free Speech."

That is gibberish and this Court should not turn a

PLAINTiffS OPPOSITION YO FRIVOlOUS SPECIAL MOTION YO STRiKE
(Cpi>OSmON 'rot'll ANTI-SILArPl? M(lIY!@N)

il"
fliI'
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110

'To recover on a claim for the reasonable value of services under

111

a quantum meruit theory, a plaintiff must establish both that he or

112

she was acting pursuant to either an express or implied request for

113

services from the defendant and that the services rendered were

114

intended to and did benefit the. defendant.~ (Ochs v. PacifiCare of

115

California (2004) i 15 Cal.AppAth 782, 794 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 734], internal

116

citation omitted.)

117

Plaintiffs have clearly pled the elements of quantum merit. There was an

118

express request for services from the defendant. Complaint para. 16, line

119

25, and on PA, line 1; para. 17, Line 17-18; para. 18, Lines 4-5. The

120

services were requested and "did benefit the defendant." Cmpt para. 76.

121

Yelp demands that plaintiff use its tools, wvrN.yelp.cmll, server and

122

computer program, wear its logo on clothes, WTist bands, hand out Yelp

123

stickers, represent that they were employees of Yelp, Inc., follow its many

124

rules or suffer "serious penalties" Complaint Para.52 1-25 and to wear Yelp

125

gear to identify them as Yelp employees and/or laborers, entitling plaintiffs

126

to wages, over and above the trinkets, bling and Yelp "undies".

PiAINTllFfS OPPOSIYI€H1/! TO fR!VOWU5i SPECIAl. MonON TO STRIKE
(OPPOSiTION TO ANTI-SLAI?P MOTION)

127
128

Yelp admissions on its website w"vw.vclij.com Yelp!'s logo is proudly

129

called a "YelpZR4.SM". Demanding more labor, YelpJ instructs its

130

writers, "Sounds like vou need to get to writing some reviews

131

there cowboy." (see decl of Bernath)
!!y for our Elite Events.

I Velp SSlM FrancisIW Shirt
a.
t

255prfnterJ

Where do you Yelp? You Yelp San
Francisco, don1 yoU? C'mon.· Sure
you do. SF is where we &1arted and
cOlltint.'e to go strong. This shirl was
pri~!ed in a limned run for Ol1l' frl:it big
nol:day party. Oh my gD$i1, you

I

I

w"r"n~ there? ~ WB!' only like tria

cooles! freaking party 011 the planet.

You're so lame.

Star Shirt···

.....::

You remember thIS 0;111117 Dude till:'

132

.:,h!7 I·; lI!(i ';.(' r(H'li Thl"- w:,s Ihe h:.. t

PILAINT!fFS @Pi"~SiT!ON TO FRiVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRII(E
(OPPOSITION TO A.NTI-SLAPP MOTRON)

•

133

Requests by defendant to provide more services and attend its business meetings

134

and wear and identify as defendant's agents and/or employees. Business meeting

135

with free liquor" ...for our first big holid&y party. Oh my gosh, you

136

weren't there? It was like the coolest freaking party on the planet.

137

You're so lame."

PLAINTifFS OI"PClSITi@N YO FRiVOLOU~ $PECIA!. MOTiON TO STRIKE
(OPPOSITION TO ANTI-$i.AIP'P MOTDON)

139

140

PlfliN1ri~1F5 «.Jiil"if'OSln@~~ 1@ IFmvowu!O SPtEC;:!AL MOTION 10 STI!UKE
{@P?OS!T!(lN: "'I'@ JiiJ.g'!"I-$~l\i?~ iV~@'iO!<C!}

141
142

"**Please note that Yelp! in the urI
line calls them "m~me§" but in the picture calls them "hot shorts"

143

PLAINTifFS IrM"p~$ln~N TO iTmvouHBS $1"~CIAt MOTION
(@pposm@N 1'0 ANii!·$II..1tflillP MOYION)

'i'@

SYIl<IKE

144

'As Witkin states in his text, "[a] common count is proper whenever

145

the plaintiff claims a sum of money due, either as an indebtedness in

146

a sum certain, or for the reasonable value of services, goods, etc.,

147

furnished. It makes no difference in such a case that the proof shows

148

the original transaction to be an express contract, a contract implied in

149

fact. or a quasi-contract." , A claim for money had and received can be

150

based upon money paid by mistake, money paid pursuant to a void

151

contract, or a pertormance by one party of an express contract." (Utility

152

Audit Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2003) i 12 Ca/'AppAth 950, 958 [5

153

Cal. Rptr.3d 520], internal citations omitted.)

154

Yelp! attempts to bring an }J'ifTI SLAPP motion as a sort of summaty

155

judgment motion with no evidence by the moving party. But it cannot meet

156

the preliminatyrequirements of the statute. Yelpl can't obtain a motion to

157

strike on an alleged ANTI STR.A.TEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC

158

PARTICIPATION because Yelp! is being brought to the bar of justice for

159

breach of contract and quasi-contract causes of action Quantum Meruit and

160

Unjust Enrichment.

161
162

On May 7, 2009 - The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's order dismissing the case. The appellate court determined that

PLAINTlI<FS OIi'POSITEON TO fRiVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRU(E
(OlO'I"OSmON TO ANTi-nAp-if! MOTIOfil>

163

plaintiff's case could proceed to trial because plaintiffs allegations might

164

support a claim for contract-like promissory estoppel and held that the

165

Communications Decency Act § 230 would not preempt the contract

166

related claims Barnes v. Yahoo!

167

httllilftinyurl.comflo4izr6 case text

.~.

mo F. ad 1096

168

insoja1' as Barnes alleges a breach of conu'act claim under

169

the theory ~fpromissory estoppel, subseC1:i.on 230(C)(1) a/the

170

Act does not preclude her cause of action. (Ol!, at 5335)

171

As we indicated above, Barnes' complaint could also be read to base

172

liability on section 90 of the Restatclnent (Second) of Contracts,
Q

173

which describes a theory ofl'ecovery often known as promissory

174

estoppel. ....

175

Such, then, is the promise that promissory estoppel requires: one that the

176

pro:missor intends~ actually or constructively, to induce reliance

177

on the part of the promisee. From such. intention courts infer the

178

intention that the promise be legally enforceable. Thus, when A

179

sues B for breach of contract, A is alleging that B violated an obligation that

180

B intended to be legally enforceable. In promissory estoppel cases, courts

P!.AINTlI'I'S OPII'IOSITION TO !FRIVOLOU5 $P!!CIAl MOTION TO STRIKE
(@PPOSITION 1"@ AN'fI-SI!.AP!l» MOYION)

~ ..

181

simply infer that intention not from consideration but from a promise that

182

B could have foreseen would induce A's reliance.

183

B Against this background, we inquire whether Barnes'

184

theory of recovery under [quasi contract] promissory

185

estoppel would treat Yahoo as a "publishe..'

186

under the Act.

187

As we explained above, subsection 230(c)(1) precludes liability when

188

the duly the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the

189

defendant's status or conduct as a publisher or speaker. In a

190

promissory estoppel case, as in any other contract case, the

191

duty the defendant allegedly -viola.ted springs from

192

~ontract-

193

contractual conduct 01' capacity of the defendant, See GTE

194

C01p., 34'7 F.3d at 662 ("Maybe [the] plaintiffs would have a

195

better ru'g!..uu.cnt that, by its coniT'ucts .," [the defendant]

196

assumed a duty to protect them. "), Barnes does not seek to

197

hold Yah.oo liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party

198

content. but rather as the counter~p-arty to a contract. as a

199

promisor Who has breached.

01'

speaker"

Q.

an enforceable promise--not from any non~

~!.AINT!rr"'S OPPOSITION TO FllUVO!.OIJS $PriCIAL MOTION "W STRIKE

(OPPOSiTION! YO

ANTi-SlAPP MOYION)

200
201

Promising is different {from publishing type actions}

202

because it is not synOl'lyrrwlls with the performance of the

203

action promised. That is, whereas one cannot undertake to do

204

something without simultaneously doing it, one can, and often

205

does, promise to do something without actually doing it at

206

the same tiane. Contract liability here would come not from Yahoo's

207

publishing conduct. but from Yahoo's manifest intention to be legally

208

obligated to do something, ..•. Contract law treats the outvval'dly

209

manifested intention to create an expectation on the part of another

210

as a legally significant event. That event generates a legal duty distinct

211

from the conduct at hand, be it the conduct of a publisher, of a doctor,

212

or of an overzealous uncle.lMl

213

footnote '4

214

Though promissory estoppcllurks on the sometimes blurry boundary

215

between contract and tort, It§ promissory character

216

distinguishes it from tort. That character drives our

217

~nalysis

218

reach of subsection 2;w(c)C1).

All the same, we believe the distinction we draw is sound.

here andplace:12Jll"omissory estoppel beuond the

219

PI.AINilFFS @PPE)SITION TO (fRiVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO SYRII{E
(@plI'lOsmot" iO ANra-f!i!.APIP MonON)

220
221

Therefore, we conclude that, insofar as Barnes alleges a breach

222

of contract claim under the theory of promissory estoppel.

223

subsection 230(c)(1) of the Act does not preclude her cause

224

of action. {EmphasJ.s added}

225

The 9th Circuit repeatedly recognizes

226

A cause of action for UI\just enrichment

227

Earlier, we recognized that a claim for unjust enrichment is

228

essentially equivalent to a claim of copyright infringement and is

229

therefore preempted. See Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gard-er,

230

Inc.,

231

other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).

820

F.2d 973,977 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on

232

233
234
235

237

Montez v. Pilgrim Films & Television 08-56954 9th Cir.
See also First Nationwide Savings v. Perf1j

11

2011

Cal.ApP-4th 1657 for

cause of action of Unjust Enrichment.

Tasini v. AOL 851 F.Supp 2d 734

P8.AINTlfFS OPPOSITII:IIN TO FRIVOLOUS SPECiAL MOHON TO STRIICE
(OPPOSITION TO ;!\I\1TI-Sl.APP MOT!ON)

239

But investors who allegedly paid tlteir share in product

240

demanded Ii percentage ownership of Huffington Post

241

The trial court in Platt v. Fox Searchlight is analogous to this case. There,

242

the laborers provided the services and the Court ordered the movie

243

company to pay in wages and not just in bHng, swag, attendance at Wrap

244

Parties and prestige2 • In Tasini, the plaintiff did not seek his wages or their

245

equitable equivalant but under equity, he demand a piece of the company.

246

Tasini complaint para. 99 "... at least $105 million in the Merger

247

Consideration recognized by [defendants) is due to the value created

248

by the content provided by Plaintiff and the Classes and the value

249

created by Plaintiff and the classes ... "

250

prayer at c. damages equal to the benefit bestowed on the

25 1

Defendants ... not less than $105,000,000"

25 2

htm:lltinyurl.comLmagwfvm

253

Tasini pled that he labored for 1050 hours for Huffington Post and

254

demanded $105 million, thus he was either demanding $100,000 an article

2

Yelp stands alone in American Industry in issuing Yelp panties to its

workforce (see below).
PICA-INT!!'!'S @PPOSIT!ON 'j'@ FRiVOLOU$ $PECIAL (MOTION .0 $TRIKE
(~PPOSI'l'ION' TO AN'fI-SLAPP MOTION)

255

or he was demanding his share ofthe enterprise as a founding member. He

256

must have been demanding his piece of the company as quantum merit

257

requires a reasonable demand and no writer gets paid $105,000,000 for

258

1050

259

minimum wage, he would have won the case as did Glatt v. Fox

260

Searchlight. But he asked for about lI3 ofthe entire company as a part

261

owner! Therefore, Tasini 2012 is distinguished and Glattt v. Fox

262

Searchlight 2013 should be this Court's guide.

hours oflabor. If Tasini had merely sued for 1050 hours work at

263

Plaintiffs are all writers for Yelp

264

And unlike Wal-Mart v Drnres

265

Do not have separate supervisors

266

At separate stores who have discriminated

267

In separate ways

268
269

Defendant is confused again. WalMart does not apply.
Since the Supreme Court's decision was rendered, the majority of
courts that have addressed Dukes' application to 216(b} collective

271

actions have held that Dukes does not apply to 216(b) collection
actions. In Creely v. HeR ManorCare, the court considered the
PI.AINTIFt'S @PPOSITION YO g::i!llIVOI.(}U~ SPI!:O:!Al MOT!ON 'f0 STRIKE
(@PPOS!TION ,01 J),NlTI-!U,APP MCl1l'ION)

273

impact of Dukes on the FLSA action pending before it and concluded

274

that it did not apply. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77170,

275

.July 1, 2011), In so doing, the court reasoned that the Dukes decision

276

turned on Rule 23(a)(2)'s "commonalii:y" requirement, however,

277

under Sixth Circuit law, Rule 23(a)(2)'s "commonality" requirement

'~3,

6 (N.D. Oh.

is distinct from the FLSA's "similarly situated" requirement as the
279

Sixth Circuit has "expressly declin[ed) to apply Rule 23's standard to

280

FLSA claims." Id. at *4 citing O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575

281

F.3d at 584. In the Sixth Circuit,

282

FLSA collective action plaintiffs have been deemed similarly situated where

283

"their claims were unified by common theories of defendants' statutory

284

violations," even though "proof of a violation as to one particular plaintiff

285

[did] not [necessarily] prove that the defendant violated any other

286

plaintiff's rights." Id. citing O'Brien at 585. Furthermore, the Creely court

287

determined that Dukes' gender-based Title VlI claims were fundamentally

288

distinct" from the FLSA claims before it since the FLSA claims before it

289

"[did] not require an examination ofthe subjective intent behind millions

290

of individual employment decisions," rather, "the em,x of [FLSA] case [was]

291

whether the company-wide policies, as implemented, violated [p]laintiff.s'

292

statutory rights," The court in Sliger et al. v. Prospect Mortgage, LLC et al.
PLAINTiffS OPPOSITION TO fRiVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRII{i:!
{OpI"OSmON 'FO AI'I!T9-n.Ap~ MOTiet<l)

•

•

293

also refused to extend Dukes' Rule 23 analysis to FLSA collective action

294

certification determinations, rejecting the defendant's argument that Rule

295

23'S commonality standard and the "similarly situated" standard of 216(b)

296

are "entirely consistent." 20il U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94648, * 7-8, n. 25 (E.D.

297

Ca1. Aug. 24, 2011).

298

Rather, after citing a string of cases holding that Rule 23 class action

299

standards are distinct from 2160))

300

declined defendant's invitation to apply Dukes to the FLSA collective action

301

certification analysis as doing so would be "inconsistent with the Ninth

302

Circuit's apparent view thatj:h.e Rule 23 standards should not be

303

used." Id at ~'4-5.

304

CERTIFICATION - 216(b) COLLECTIVE ACTIONS v. RULE 23 CLASS
ACTIONS & ENTERPRISE COVERAGE UNDER THE FLSA Wage & Hour

305
306

collectiv~

action standards, the court

Boot Camp ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law 11.2-5.11

307
308

309

Yelp's Control and Right to Control Plaintiff writers
YELP'S Ai TiMES CULT UKE CQJNl'F~OI!. OF PLJUNnFFS THROUGH

312

PLAINTiffS OPI"OSIYION TO IFRiVOLOUS SPECIAl. MOTION TO STRIKE
(OPPOSITION 10 ANil-SlAPP MOYiON)

f

,.

,

313

314

rf"mvowus 3PI'<€:IA!. MOTIIi)N
{(Jipposmow TtJ ANii-$lAIilIED M011@N)

PII.AIIII'l'IFI'S O"'P@SiTlIOIII 'f0

.0 STIIUKE

315
316

"undies" is in the URL

o

N

Q)

~

317

Po.

PlAiNTiFFS I\')I"Ii>OSiY!~1\l 1'@ 1F1R1'\!@wIlJS lil'lEitiAL MOTiON '1'0 STRIKE
(@PPOSiTl@!\3 '1"0 I~U\lll'l-:!l.l,~Jil'!19 MOTION)

318

"·*Please note that Yelp! in the urlline calls them "undies" but in the

319

picture calls them "hot shorts"

320

3 21

Kl'LAINTIFFS@IPPOSITiON TO ~R!VOLOUS $PEItIAI. MOTION TO STRIKE
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322
323

Attached exhibits (slap pictures in Opposing an anti SLAPP motion

:324

and pillow fight with Yelp executive, caption "make me Yelp";

325

Yelp!'s logo is proudly called a "YelJ}.lgasm". Demanding more

326

labor; Yelp! instructs its vvriters, "Sounds like you need to get to

327

writing some reviews there cowboy.."

PLAINTIffS OpPIOSITION TO !FRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
(OPPOSITION ,0 ANTI-SLAPIl» MOYION)

328
329

Social pressure on the free writers to adhere to the social pressure

330

from Yelp! and its gatherings with free liquor 6G ... for aur first big

331

holiday party. Oh my gosh. you weren't there? It was like

- , - thinks is~
'0' :;:,r,d~~r:;,~~~:~~C
COUsIn
tllatw,D,
p.'ayer You're writing aoolu . " .. '
lotally. These sUckers Were handed
out at our HOi Summer Mghts parrj

333
PI.AINTIFFS OIl"P@SITION ,@ fRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION 11'0 STRIKE
(@i"Ii'OS'T!@N TO ANYI-SIl.A.PP MOTION)

334

"That's totally going in my review" Criminal Intimidation

335

message sent from Yelp!, through its non-wage paid labor to the

336

merchant to either give free food, pay cash to the reviewer, buy

337

protection/advertising or face a scathing business destroying review.

338

Yelp! encourages its free laborers to criminally threaten merchants

339

and gives this Court documentalY evidence of its extortion tactics.

340

341

343

ItAUFCbRNIA'S PJNiT~ SlAPP $TA1iYTIE

The Chief and another justice on the Ninth Circuit have indicated that

344

court should revisit its prior decisions on whether the California anti-

345

SLAPP act applies in federal court. The majority of 9th Circuit justices,

346

discussing rigorous requirements of class actions but not the permissive

347

requirements of collective actions specifically found in and distinguished in

348

the Fail' Labor Standards Act and denied an en bane hearing.

349

The guiding statements came earlier in Makaef[v. Trump, Univ. (11-55016

350

9th Cir 20131 hIm: IItinyurl.com/khbztba In that lawsuit, Makaeff

351

brought a class action (not a ~olkctive actior.) against Trump University,

352

alleging that it engaged in deceptive business practices.

PLAINTiffS OPPOSIT!ON TO FRIVOLOUS !jPECIAI. MOTION TO STRIKE
(@PPOSITION 1'0 ANI'f!-$i,APP M(,;TION)

•

353

According to Chief Judge Kozinski:

354

The anti-SLAPP statute creates no substantive rights; it merely provides a

355

procedural mechanism for vindicating existing rights. The language of the

356

statute is procedural: Its mainspring is a "special motion to strike"; it

357

contains provisions limiting discovery; it provides for sanctions for parties

358

who bring a non-meritorious suit or motion; the court's ruling on the

359

potential success of plaintiffs claim is not "admissible in evidence at any

360

later stage of the case"; and an order granting or denying t.lte special motion

361

is immediately appealable.

362

Because state rules of procedure have no effect in federal court, according

363

to Chief Judge Kozinski, "this is the beginning and the end of the analysis,

364

"[t]he. CallfOl:nia anti-SIAPP statute cHi§ an ugly gash through

365

this o:l:'derly process" Judge Paez wrote "I agree that California anti-

366

SLAPP statute is 'quintessentially procedural' and its application in federal

367

court has created a hybrid ]]l.ess that now resembles neither the Federal

368

Rules nor the original state statute"

370
371
372

Daniel A. Bernath, attorney for plaintiffs 01.10.2014
PLAINTIFFS CPrP'OSITION TO ~RIVOI.OUS $Pi:CIAL MOTION TO STRIKE

(OPPOSITION .0 ANTI-$LAPP MOTION)

..

From: Daniel A. Bernath, Lawyer
To aschur@yelp.commg@casp.net
1.t.14 at 9:53 AM
To Mark Goldowitz,
Paul Clifford,
Shanti Michaels
Evan l'vIascagni
Aaron Shur,
This letter is a demand that you withdtaw your frivolous Anti Slapp motion to su1ke a common
count.
Common count, also kno\vn as quantum meruit, is based in contract.

•

"To recover on a claim for the reasonable value of services under a quantum meruit
theory, a plaintiff must establish both that he or she was acting pru:suant to either an
express or implied request for services from the defendant and that the services
tendered were intended to and did benefit the defendant." (Ochs Y. Paci£iCare of
California (2004) 115 Cal.J.ppAth 782, 794 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 734]. internal citlltion omitted.)

•

"'As Witkin states in his text, "[a] common count is proper whenever the plaintiff
claims a sum of money due, either as an indebtedness in a sum certain, or for the
reasonable value of services, goods, etc., fumished. It makes no difference in such a case
that the proof shows the original transaction to be an express contract, a contract implied
in fact, or a quasi-contract." , A claim for money had and received can be based upon
money paid by mistake, money paid pursuant to a void contract, or a performance by one
party of an express contract." (Utility Audit Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 112
Cal.AppAth 950, 958 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 520], internal citations omitted.)

You are well aware of the case Barnes v. Yahoo where the 9th Circuit Court has at least three times
stated that contract based causes of action are not reachable by anti slapp motions.
Therefore, I shall point out to the Court your fri"olous motion, which intentionally ignores Barnes
v. Yahoo and your "special motion to strike" which you have used to bypass the well established rule
that a demurrer must not include addition evidence outside of the complaint. You have, for
example, put in a so called Rules for Elites that you drafted well after my clients had performed their
as yet unpaid labors for you.
I send you this leeter to meet and confer with you

strike.
Daniel A. Bernath, Lawyer

to

urge you to withdraw your frivolous motion to
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4

peter Rukin (SBN 178336)
RUKIN HYLAND DORIA & Tl1\'DALL LLP
100 Pine Street, Suite 2150
San Francisco, CA 9411 J
Telephone: (415) 421-1800
Facsimile: (415) 421-1700
E-mail: peten·ukin@xhdtlaw.com

5

Rosa Vigil-Gallenberg (SBN 251872)

2

3

GALLENBERG PC
6

9701 Wilshire Blvd. Suite )000
Beverly Hills, CA 90071
Telephone: (310) 295-1654
Facsimile: (310) 733-5654
Email: rosa@gallenberglaw.com

7
8

!ml McLoughlin (pro hac vice application to be filed)
Tom UnliY (pro hac vice application to be t1led)
SHAPIRO HABER &. URMY LLP
53 State Street 13th Floor
Boston, !vIA ()2109
Telephone: (617) 439-3939
Facsimile: (617) 439-0134

9
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E-mail: tbeyman@slmlaw.coUl
13
Att011l0YS for Representative Plaintiffs
14
15
lJNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
16

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
17
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
18

JUSTIN LARKIN, ANTHONY TIJERINO, and
19

AHMAD DEANES,

OIl

behalf of themselves and

all others similarly situated,
20
Plai.'ltiffs,
21

v.
22

YELP! INC.,

23

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND M.EMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT

Date: June 1. 2012
Defendant.

24

Case No. 3:11-cv-OI503-EMC

p.m.

Time: 1:30
Comtroom: 5 _17 th Floor

Judge:

HOll.

Edward M. Chen
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Justin Larkin, Anthony Tijerino, and Ahmad Deanes (hereinafter "Plaintiffs")

2

3

seek prelimiuaty approval ofthi, proposed class and collective action settiementPlaiutiffs entered

4

on behalf of themselves and the proposed Class of Account Executives employed by Yelpl Inc.

5

("Defendant or "Yelp"), which will provide for a maximum settlement payment of$I,250,000 in

6

retmll for a release and dismissal with prejudice of the claims asserted against Yelp in this actioll.

7

The net setilement fund will be disuibuted to Patlicipating Class Members based

8

work weeks Class Memberf, w,)rked dmtllg the felevant class period.

OIl

the nnmber of

Plaintiffs Md Class Members worked as ACcolm! Executives for Yelp. Daring the relevant

9
10

class period, Yelp cla.ssified Account Execlltives as exempt £i'om the overtime requirement, of

II

federal atld state law and paid them at a straight-time rate of pay rather thatl an ovettime rate of pay

12

for the overtime hours that they worked. Plainl1ffs challenged til,s pay practice on the gronnds that

13

Yelp's classification of its Account Executives as exempt was unlawful beoause tilese employees

14

did not fall into the commission/inside sales exemption, the administrative exemption, or any other

15

knowll exemption.
The proposed Setllement is fair and reasonable in light oftlle risks Plaintiffs and Class

16
17

Members faced ill cOIDlectioll with the class certification, liability, and damages phases of this case

18

atld the value oftl1e claims should Plaintiffs prevail. Plaintiffs contend that Yelp cannot seriously

19

dispUte Ihe alleg()d misclassification of Account Exp.cutives, which lies at the heart of this case, as

20

there is no colorable exemption del'ense. However, Plaintiffs face several potentia! proce-tlmal

21

hurdles. Specifically, Yelp contends that overtime claim releases signed by some pllt~Jive class

n

members in March 2011, a class action prohibition policy promulgated by Yelp in February 2011

23

signed by a m?Jority of Class Members, and severance agreement releases signed by former

24

employees (including the two California-based named Plaintiffs) will bar the participation of the

25

vast majority of potential class members. A detenuination that the releases and/or the class action

26

waiver are valid would significantly Harrow the scope of the case and/or present a potential barrier

27

to recovelY for many Class Members.

28

I
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To avoid that risk, Plaintiffs' counsel have negotiated a Settlement that creates a maxinnnn
Settlement~·negotiated

2

settlement amount of$I,250,OOO. Plaintiffs' counsel believe that this

3

extensively and Rt ann's length with the assislanc{l of an experienced mediator-is a fair and

4

reasonable resolution of the claims against Yelp in light of the risks Plaintiffs face if this matter

5

proceeds to nia!. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfhIly request thai this Court: (I) grant preliminary

6

approval of the proposed settlement; (2) conditionally certify for settlement pUlposes a National

7

Settiemellt Class; (3) conditionally certify a Califomia Class for seltlement ptnposes; (4) approve

g

the [o11n, content, a..'ld metllOd of distributioll of the Notices and Proof of Claim f011us: (5) appoint

9

Simpluris, Inc. ("Simpluris"), as the Claims Administrator pursuant to the Settlement Agreement;

10

(6) appoint Rukin Hyland Doria & Tindall LLP, Gailenbcrg PC, and Shapiro Haber & Drmy LLP

II

as seltlement Class COlUlsel; and (7) schedule a healing regarding fInal approval oftha proposed

12

settlement ruld Class COlmsel's requ"st for attorney's fees, costs, and incentive award payments.

13

n.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

14

A.

Factual Background and the Patties' ContelltiollS

15

Yelp is a San Francisco-based company which operates a social networking and nscr

16

review website. Yelp generates revenue tllfOUgh tlle sale of advertising and uses inside sales

17

persollnel, called "Account Executives," to secure its advertising business. Account Executives

18

work under different titles, depending on their experience and seniority: accoml! executive trainee,

19

junior account .executive, aCC('fmt ?xecH/ive, or senior acc.()\mt execntive. RegardleS5 of title, all

20

Account Executives have the same core responsibility to seli Yelp's adveltising products.

21

From the beginning of its operations until approximately March 201 I, Yelp classified its

22

Ac.count Executives as exempt ii-om federal and state overtime laws. Yelp paid aU Account

23

Execntives under a similar compensation plan during the liability period. Although some details

24

varied. all ACCoUllt Executives received a base salary and Iud the ability to earn additional

25

compensation or (:0 move to a higher lev,,1 of compensation based on pe&mU3Ilce.

26
27

Each of the Plaintiffs 1I'0rke,\ for Yelp as an ACCotUlt Executive. Docket Nllluber ("Dkt.
No.") 4, at ~ 9-! 1. Plaintiff Lal'kin worked in Yelp'S San Francisco office fiol1l September 2008 to

28

2
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I

March 2009 and PJaintiffTije1"ino worked in the San Francisco office fi'om February 2010 through

2

November 2010. [d. at ~ 9-10. PlaintiffDeanes worked out of Yelp's Scottsdale, Arizona office

3

:from October 2010 to January 2011. ld. aT ~ 11.

4

•

Plaintiffs (~olltelld that Yelp misclassitled its Account Executives as exempt fi'om overtime,

5

alid that, on the basis of litis exempt classificatio1l, Yelp did not pay Account ExeClltives the

6

overtim() wages required Ullder the FLSA or Califomia law.

7

Yelp contends that Plaintiffs' claims have no merit. Yelp asselis that the majority of class

8

members, including two of tile nanled Plaintiffs, have signed releases that prevent them from

9

bringing the claims asserted in this lawsuit. Yelp also claims that many class members have agreed

II)

to pursue any claims that they may have individually rather than on a class or collective action

II

basis, effectively precluding them It-om pruticipating in this actioll.

12

B,

Procedllral History

13

On March 29, 2011, Plaintiff Jnstin Larkin filed this action ill the United States District

14

COllIt for tile Northern District of Califomia, asserting claims under the FLSA for unpaid oveltime

15

and (mder the Califonlia Labor Code for unpaid overtime, waiting time penalties, wage statement

16

danJages, and restitnlion. Dkt. No. I.

17

On April 18, 20 II, Plaintiff Justin Larkin provided notice to the Califomia Labor and

18

Workforce Development Agency and Yelp in accordance with the procedures set fOlth in the

19

Californja Labor Code's Private Attomeys General Act, Labor Code § 2698 at. seq. (PAGA) of the

20

PAGA claim in tius caso. The PAGA notice inclnded a file-endorsed copy oftlle c.omplaint.

21
22

Oll April 19, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an 8mende,1 complaint adding two additional plaintiffS,
Allthony Tijerina and Ahmad Deanes. Diet. No.4.

23

On May II, 2011, tlle parties executed an agreement tolling the FLSA statute of limitation

24

for all potential collective action members effective May II, 2011. Declaration of Peter Rukill [n

25

SUppolt ofPlainiifts' Moticn for Preliminary Approval of Class and Collective Action Settlement

26

("Rukin Ded. ") ~ 7. On May 20, 2012, the parties executed a stipulation reqnesting a stay of the

27

proceedings pending mediation and pennitting the filing of a second amended complaint adding a

28
3
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